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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in this Court is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
In his brief, appellant Brian M. Barnard ("Barnard") frames six (6) separate issues 
on appeal in an argumentative manner that assumes their conclusion. Appellees Cindi 
Mansell ("Mansell"), the Ogden City Recorder, and Gary Williams ("Williams"), the 
Ogden City Attorney (collectively "appellees"), restate and summarize Barnard's multiple 
issues into one consolidated issue on appeal: 
ISSUE: Did the trial court properly impose sanctions against Barnard pursuant to 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? 
III. DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 11, Utah R. Civ. P. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
On or about October 1, 2007, Barnard filed a Complaint and Motion for Immediate 
Injunction and Extraordinary Writ on behalf of sixty-two (62) Ogden City residents, 
seeking to have Mayor Matthew Godfrey's name removed from the ballot in the 
November 2007 Ogden City mayoral election. Barnard requested an expedited and 
immediate hearing on the matter. (R. at 1-85). During an October 5, 2007 telephone 
conference with counsel, Barnard confirmed that he had received a copy of a 
memorandum from the Ogden City Attorney addressing plaintiffs' claims prior to filing 
the Complaint. (R. at 644-46). On October 11, 2007, counsel for appellees sent Barnard 
a safe harbor letter advising him that they intended to seek Rule 11 sanctions if the 
frivolous lawsuit was not dismissed immediately. (R. at 648). The same day they sent the 
safe harbor letter, appellees filed a Motion to Dismiss and a Motion for Attorney's Fees 
and Costs, seeking attorney's fees and costs under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.l (R. at 
113-149). These filings further outlined the frivolous nature of plaintiffs' lawsuit. 
Following an expedited briefing schedule, on October 23, 2007. the trial court 
conducted a hearing on plaintiffs' Complaint and Motion for Immediate Injunction and 
Extraordinary Writ, and defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Attorney's Fees 
and Costs. (R. at 288, 802). At the conclusion of the October 23rd hearing, the trial court 
denied plaintiffs' Motion for Immediate Injunction and Extraordinary Writ and granted 
defendants" Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs. The court 
found that plaintiffs* Complaint was frivolous and had been filed in bad faith such as to 
justify an award of attorney's fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. The trial court 
reserved on ruling on the amount of fees and costs to be awarded to defendants, instructed 
counsel for the defendants to prepare and file attorney's fee affidavits, and informed 
plaintiffs that they had the right to respond/object to the affidavits. (R. at 802 pp. 30-38). 
Following the submission of attorney's fee affidavits by defendants and extensive 
'Effective February 7. 2008. Section 78-27-56 was renumbered as Section 
78B-5-825. For purposes of this appeal, appellees shall refer to the statute as "Section 
78-27-56/* 
briefing by the parties on the issue of attorney's fees, on February 29, 2008, the trial court 
issued its Memorandum Decision, wherein it awarded appellees a portion of their 
attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $14,448.67 pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-27-56, and awarded defendant Godfrey a portion of his attorney's fees and costs in the 
amount of $718.75. (R. at 306-321, 322-470, 473-497, 502-525, 530-33, 534-39, 540-48, 
559-98, 599-600, 619-623). The trial court entered judgment against the plaintiffs on 
April 8, 2008.2 (R. at 658-666). 
In explaining its decision, the trial court determined that "plaintiffs' lawsuit was 
brought without merit and in bad faith" in "an attempt to discredit and remove Matthew 
Godfrey as a candidate for mayor." Moreover, the court "rejected plaintiffs' 
interpretation of the city ordinance and their position in this litigation." And finally, the 
trial court concluded that plaintiffs' lawsuit was a "vindictive, frivolous, bad faith 
lawsuit." After awarding defendants a portion of their fees and costs against the 
individual plaintiffs, the trial court stated that "[t]his result does not preclude the parties 
from requesting sanctions under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." (R. at 
620-22, 662-64). 
Acting upon the trial court's invitation, on March 31, 2008, appellees filed their 
formal Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions against Barnard. (R. at 631-651). Following 
briefing by the parties, on June 26, 2008, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision 
imposing Rule 11 sanctions. (R. at 673-686. 687-690, 715-727, 748-754). On July 29, 
2The individual plaintiffs did not appeal from this judgment. 
*> 
2008, the trial court signed its final order requiring Barnard to pay $10,000 in Rule 11 
sanctions to appellees. (R. at 763-770). 
Barnard filed a timely Notice of Appeal on his own behalf appealing from the 
Order and Judgment imposing Rule 11 sanctions against him. Plaintiffs did not join in 
Barnard's Notice of Appeal; nor did they file their own Notice of Appeal. (R. at 778-780). 
B. RESPONSE TO BARNARD'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellees submit that Barnard's Brief, and particularly his Statement of Facts 
therein, is improper and should be largely disregarded because it fails to satisfy the 
standard set forth in Koulis v. Standard Oil, 746 P.2d 1182 (1987), that a brief must be 
concise, presented with accuracy, and free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or 
scandalous matters.3 Barnard's fact statement is filled with inaccurate and distorted 
assertions that are not supported by the record he cites, based on inadmissible evidence, 
and/or wholly irrelevant and immaterial to the issues on appeal. It is also peppered with 
legal argument and many statements which are conclusory and speculative. Appellees 
respond to these facts, and clarify the record, as follows: 
Procedural History 
1. In paragraph 1, Barnard states that ~[s]ixty-two (62) voters of Ogden City 
on October L 2007 sued seeking declaratory judgment equitable relief and an 
extraordinary writ." It should also be noted. ho\* ever, that the lead plaintiff in the case, 
Doroth} LittrelL has been a long-time critic of Mayor Godfre} ("Mayor Godfre}") and his 
3Briefs which do not comply with the Koulis standard ma} be disregarded or 
stricken sua sponte by the Court, with the assessment of attorne} *s fees. Id at 1185. 
A 
administration. (R. at 121). 
2. Paragraph 2 incorrectly suggests that plaintiffs' Complaint merely sought 
"declaratory relief with regard to the Ogden City ordinance. In addition to seeking 
declaratory relief, plaintiffs' complaint unfairly singled out Mayor Godfrey and sought to 
have his name, and only his name, removed from the ballot. (R. at 9, 12). If plaintiffs 
merely wanted to have Ogden City's ordinance interpreted, they could have filed a 
declaratory judgment action naming only the city. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-2 
(2007). Instead, plaintiffs chose to target Mayor Godfrey, while ignoring the fact that 
every other candidate was also allegedly in violation of Ogdpn City's ordinance based 
upon plaintiffs' incorrect interpretation. (R. at 507-08). 
3. Appellees did file a motion to dismiss, a motion for expedited briefing and 
hearing, and a motion for an award of attorney's fees on October 11, 2007. It is important 
to note, however, that appellees did not file their motions until after their counsel had 
spoken with Barnard to confirm that he had received a copy of the Ogden City Attorney's 
memorandum addressing plaintiffs' claims. They also sent Barnard a safe harbor letter 
advising him that they intended to seek Rule 11 sanctions if the frivolous lawsuit was not 
dismissed immediately. (R. at 644-46, 48). Barnard and his clients elected to ignore 
these warnings and press forward with their frivolous lawsuit. 
4. Appellees do not dispute that they filed a Consolidated Memorandum in 
Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Immediate Injunction and Extraordinary Writ and in Support of Defendants' Motion for 
Attorney's Fees and Costs containing fifteen (15) pages of argument. (R. at 120-149). 
Barnard's argument that this was a technical violation of Rule 7(c)(2), Utah R. Civ. P. 
lacks merit for the following reasons. First, appellees filed an Ex-Parte Application for 
Leave to File an Over-Length Memorandum. (R. at 100-03). Second, appellees could 
have filed separate memoranda with up to ten (10) pages of argument addressing each of 
their motions, but the motions were all related and it was more efficient and logical to file 
one consolidated memorandum. Third, Barnard raised this same technical argument in 
the trial court and it was rejected. (R. at 802 p. 24). Finally, Barnard is guilty of the very 
same technical violation about which he is now complaining. For instance, on or about 
December 3, 2007, Barnard simultaneously filed a motion for leave to file an over-length 
memorandum and an over-length memorandum containing thirteen (13) pages of 
argument. (R. at 471-72, 473-497). The trial court never formally granted Barnard leave 
to file an over-length memorandum. 
5. While it may be true that "[t]he motion of Defendants for expedited briefing 
and hearing was never formally granted,'* the trial court did schedule an expedited hearing 
for October 23, 2007. Plaintiffs had previously requested an immediate hearing on their 
Motion for Immediate Injunction and Extraordinary Writ, and appellees requested that 
their motions be heard at the same time. (R. at 84-85, 104-112, 802 pp. 19-20). During a 
telephonic scheduling conference prior to the hearing, the clerk stated that the trial court 
intended to hear all of the pending motions during the October 23rd hearing. (R. at 110). 
6. Paragraph 6 states that "[pjlaintiffs responded to defendants' motion to 
dismiss and opposed the motion for expedited briefing on October 22. 2007/" the day 
before the expedited hearing requested by the plaintiffs. (R. at 84-85). Despite 
defendants' repeated efforts to contact Barnard in an effort t0 work out a briefing 
schedule leading up to the October 23rd hearing, as suggested by the trial court, Barnard 
ignored counsel and strung them along until the day before the expedited hearing to file 
his responsive memoranda. (R. at 232-282, 283-85, 286-87, 289). As a result, appellees 
were forced to file their reply memoranda just prior to the hearing. (R. at 214-226, 227-
231). 
7. In paragraph 7, Barnard states that "[n]either the docket nor the notice of 
hearing show that the Motion for Attorney Fees was to be heard" at the October 23, 2007 
hearing. However, the clerk informed the parties during a telephonic scheduling 
conference that the trial court intended to hear all pending motions during the October 
23rd hearing. (R. at 110). The trial court's Notice of Oral Argument was prepared on 
October 10, 2007, and defendants did not file their motions until October 11, 2007. That 
is why defendants' motions do not appear on the formal Notice of Oral Argument. (R. at 
92-93, 104-149). 
8. Although the normal deadline to respond to appellees' Motion for 
Attorney's Fees and Costs would not have occurred until after the October 23, 2007 
hearing, the clerk informed the parties that the trial court intended to hear all pending 
motions during the October 23rd hearing. (R. at 110). The trial court also asked the 
parties to work out a briefing schedule that would allow both parties an opportunity to 
brief their motions prior to the hearing. (R. at 289). Barnard ignored that advice and 
waited until the day before the expedited hearing to file his responsive memoranda. (R. at 
232-282, 283-85, 286-87, 289). Moreover, plaintiffs' Notice Re: Plaintiffs' Response to 
7 
Motion for Fees, wherein Barnard unilaterally informed the trial court that his clients 
would not respond to defendants' Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs until after the 
October 23rd hearing, directly conflicted with the trial court's directive that it intended to 
hear all pending motions during the October 23rd hearing. Additionally, the trial court did 
not receive Barnard's Notice until the day before the scheduled hearing. (R. at 286). 
9. During the October 23rd hearing, Barnard "objected to consideration of the 
motion for an award of attorney fees." The trial court heard, considered and rejected 
those objections. As explained above, Barnard was previously informed by the trial court 
that it intended to hear all pending motions during the October 23rd hearing. (R. at 110). 
Barnard's repeated efforts to prevent that from occurring did not succeed. (R. at 802 pp. 
19-20). It must be remembered that this case was on an extremely expedited schedule at 
the request of plaintiffs, who were claiming the matter needed to be resolved before the 
election, which was scheduled for November 6, 2007. 
10. At the conclusion of the October 23rd hearing, the trial court granted 
defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs after carefully 
considering the evidence and arguments of counsel. The court found that plaintiffs' 
Complaint was frivolous and had been filed in bad faith such as to justify an award of 
attorney's fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. The court reserved ruling on the 
amount of fees and costs to be awarded to defendants, instructed counsel for the 
defendants to prepare and file attorney's fee affidavits, and informed plaintiffs that they 
had the right to respond/object to the affidavits. (R. at 802 pp. 30-38). 
11. Appellees do not dispute that following the October 23rd hearing Barnard 
filed 'twenty-one (21) affidavits by named plaintiffs'' in an effort to counteract the trial 
court's finding of bad faith. Unfortunately, with the exception of the Affidavit of 
Dorothy E. Littrell, which is substantially similar but includes slightly different language, 
the remaining 20 affidavits are all identical. (R. 322-470). Rather than being based on 
the affiants' personal knowledge of relevant, admissible evidence, the affidavits were 
merely mass produced by Barnard in an effort to reargue the case. See infra General 
Response to Paragraphs 31-49. 
12. Paragraph 12 provides that u[o]n December 3, 2007, plaintiffs filed a memo 
opposing defendants' motion for attorney fees" and u[t]he trial court disregarded that 
memo/' The trial court considered and rejected plaintiffs' arguments. Rather than simply 
responding and/or objecting to the attorney's fee affidavit submitted by counsel for 
appellees, plaintiffs' memorandum was nothing more than an attempt by plaintiffs to 
reargue the case and invite the trial court to revisit its prior rulings. (R. at 306-321, 473-
497, 502-520). In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court noted that it ~ha[d] already 
rejected plaintiffs' interpretation of the city ordinance and their position in the litigation 
and ha[d] already determined that plaintiffs lawsuit was brought without merit and in bad 
faith." (R. at 620). 
Relevant Provisions of Ogden City Municipal Code4 
13. Appellees agree that all candidates for any elected office of Ogden City 
must comply with the campaign finance disclosure requirements set forth in § 1-8-1 et 
Paragraphs 14 through 20 correspond to paragraphs 14 through 20 of Barnard's 
Statement of Facts and address the relevant provisions of O^den Cit\ Municipal Code. 
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seq. of the Ogden Municipal Code. Copies of relevant sections of the Ogden City 
Municipal Code are attached as Exhibit A to plaintiffs' Complaint. (R. at 16-23). 
14. Section 1-8-2 requires that certain activities be conducted through an entity 
called a ''personal campaign committee" ("PCC). Subsection A of Section 1-8-2 
provides as follows: 
No person or persons shall receive any contributions on behalf of a 
candidate for elected office of the City or make any expenditures for 
political purposes for the candidate either directly or indirectly other than 
through a personal campaign committee, whose authority to act shall be 
filed as provided by this Chapter. 
Ogden Municipal Code § 1-8-2A. (R. at 17). 
15. Subsection D of Section 1-8-2 requires that candidates register their PCC 
with the Ogden City Recorder. It provides as follows: 
Before the personal campaign committee makes any expenditure for 
political purposes on behalf of the candidate, or incurs any obligation, 
express or implied, to make an expenditure in the candidate's behalf, the 
candidate or committee shall file with the City Recorder a written 
statement, signed by the candidate setting forth that the candidate's 
personal campaign committee has been appointed or elected, and 
giving the name and address of each member and the secretary of the 
committee. 
Ogden Municipal Code § 1-8-2D (emphasis added). (R. at 17). Thus. Subsection D 
expressly states, and only requires, the filing of a statement "that the candidate's personal 
campaign committee has been appointed or elected, and gi\ ing the name and address of 
each member and the secretary of the committee." No other registration requirements are 
imposed by the ordinance. 
16. Section 1-8-4 requires the filing of verified financial statements b} each 
candidate or PCC on certain dates set forth by the ordinance, See Ogden Municipal Code 
§ 1-8-4. (R. at 19-20). 
17. Subsection 1-8-5 A requires that the City Recorder inspect the financial 
statements of each candidate. It provides in relevant part as follows: 
The City Recorder shall inspect all financial statements within two (2) days 
after the same are filed. If it appears that any candidate or personal 
campaign committee has failed to file a statement as required by law or if it 
appears that the statement does not conform to law or upon complaint in 
writing by a candidate or by a voter that a statement filed does not 
conform to law, the City Recorder shall notify the delinquent personal 
campaign committee or candidate, in writing, req^sting compliance 
with this Chapter. 
Ogden Municipal Code § 1-8-5A (emphasis added). (R. at 21). 
18. Subsection 1-8-5B discusses when the City Recorder shall inspect the books 
and records of a candidate or PCC. It provides in relevant part as follows: 
Upon the failure of any personal campaign committee or candidate to file a 
statement, within two (2) days after first receiving written notice under 
subsection A of this Section, or, if in the exercise of reasonable discretion, 
the City Recorder questions the accuracy or completeness of such 
statement, the City Recorder shall request an examination of all books and 
records of such committee or person. Such books an<jl records shall be 
produced by the candidate or personal campaign committee for inspection 
by the City Recorder within one day after request for examination is 
received. 
Ogden Municipal Code § 1-8-5B. (R. at 21). 
19. Subsection 1-8-5D provides a private right of action to registered voters as 
follows: "In the event the City Recorder or the City Attorney refuses to take the actions 
provided by this Section, any registered voter in the City may institute appropriate 
proceedings for an extraordinary writ/* Ogden Municipal Cbde § 1-8-5D. (R. at 21). 
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20. Finally, Subsection 1-8-6A addresses the consequences of a candidate's 
failure to file the financial statement required by Section 1-8-4. It provides that u[t]he 
name of a candidate shall not be printed on, or if already printed shall be removed from, 
the official ballot for the ensuing election unless the statements of contributions and 
expenditures relating to the candidate have been filed by the candidate or the 
candidate's personal campaign committee as required by this Chapter." Ogden 
Municipal Code § 1-8-6A (emphasis added). (R. at 22). 
Application of the Disclosure Requirements 
21. Appellees acknowledge that "[a]s a mayoral candidate in the November 
2007 election, Mayor Godfrey was subject to the Ogden City Municipal Code §§ 1-8-1 et 
seqr (R. at 16-23). 
22-24. Despite Barnard's allegations to the contrary, Mayor Godfrey fully 
complied with those requirements. First, Mayor Godfrey established a PCC, as required 
by Section 1-8-2 of the Ogden Municipal Code. Mayor Godfrey's PCC was known as 
"People to Re-elect Matthew Godfrey." (R. at 6, 34). Second, Mayor Godfrey registered 
his PCC with the City Recorder as required by Subsection 1-8-2D. (R. at 159, 163). 
Mayor Godfrey's registration form satisfied the simple requirements of Subsection 1-8-
2D. Although Mayor Godfrey's registration did not state the specific name of his PCC, 
that information is not required by Section 1-8-2D and Ogden City's PCC registration 
form does not ask for. or provide a space to disclose, the name of the candidate's PCC. 
(R. at 17, 163). Significantly, Mayor Godfrey registered his PCC on the registration 
forms prepared and provided by Ogden City7. (R. at 19). Moreover. Mayor Godfrey used 
the very same forms as every other mayoral candidate. Non£ of the other candidates 
provided the specific name of their PCC on the registration forms.5 (R. at 159, 163-67). 
25. Appellees agree that on September 13, 2007, lpad plaintiff Dorothy Littrell 
delivered a complaint to Mansell concerning Mayor Godfrey's alleged failure to register 
his PCC, "People to Re-elect Matthew Godfrey," with the City Recorder as allegedly 
required by Section 1-8-2 of the Ogden City Code. (R. at 7, 38-39). 
26. As required by the Ogden City ordinance, on September 17, 2007, Mansell 
notified Mayor Godfrey that a complaint had been filed, provided copies of the relevant 
code sections and requested his response. (R. at 7, 21, 42). She also forwarded a copy of 
the complaint to Gary Williams, the City Attorney. 
27. Barnard is correct that Mayor Godfrey responded to Littrell's complaint in 
an email to Mansell and Williams dated September 19, 2007. Mayor Godfrey explained 
that the entity, "People to Re-elect Matthew Godfrey," was fyis PCC as required by 
Section 1-8-2 of the Ogden Municipal Code. Mayor Godfrey also explained that he had 
complied with the registration requirements for his PCC, an<$ that he was not required to 
register the specific name for his PCC. As Mayor Godfrey seated, 'there is no filing 
requirements for names, nor is there a process to even do so. No candidate has submitted 
a name for a personal campaign committee as is being reque$ted of me, because there is 
no mechanism to do so." (R. at 8, 34). 
5Of course, one would not expect these other candidates to have provided the 
specific name of their respective PCCs on their registration fforms, since Section 1-8-2D 
does not require them to do so. 
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28. Although Mayor Godfrey was required to file financial statements with the 
City Recorder, those filings did not have to be made in the name of his PCC as implied by 
Barnard. Mayor Godfrey filed the necessary financial statements as required by Section 
1-8-4 of the Ogden Municipal Code. Those filings were made on the fonns prepared and 
provided by Ogden City, were made in a timely manner, and complied with the 
requirements of Section 1-8-4. (R. at 25-33). 
29. Based upon her flawed interpretation of the Ogden City ordinance, "Littrell 
demanded that Mansell require Godfrey to produce and that Mansell examine all records 
of 'People to Re-Elect Matthew Godfrey.'" (R. at 9, 44). 
30. "Mansell did not examine the records" of Mayor Godfrey's PCC because no 
such examination was warranted or required. The City Recorder is only required to 
request an examination of a candidate or PCC's books and records 6b[u]pon the failure of 
any personal campaign committee or candidate to file a statement... or, if in the exercise 
of reasonable discretion, the City Recorder questions the accuracy or completeness of 
such statement." Ogden Municipal Code § 1-8-5B. (R. at 21). In this case, Mayor 
Godfrey filed the appropriate registration and financial statements. Moreover, Mansell 
reviewed Mayor Godfrey's filings and determined that there was no basis to request an 
audit. (R. at 159). Thus. Mansell was not obligated to request and make an examination 
of all books and records of Mayor Godfrey's PCC.6 
6Gary Williams, the City Attorney, also reviewed Littrelfs complaints and 
determined that they were entirely without merit. Williams prepared a detailed 
memorandum dated September 26. 2007. addressing Littrelfs defective claims. (R. at 
203-210). On September 28. 2007. Mansell provided Littrell with a copy of Williams* 
Plaintiffs' Alleged Goals, Purposes and pood Faith 
General Response to Paragraphs 31-49. Paragraphs 31 through 49 are based 
entirely on the affidavits of 21 of the individual plaintiffs. See Barnard's Brief at 13 n.5. 
(R. at 322-470). With the exception of the Affidavit of Dorothy E. Littrell (R. at 399-
407), which is substantially similar but includes slightly different language, the remaining 
20 affidavits are all essentially word for word identical. Rather than stating the affiants' 
personal knowledge of relevant, admissible evidence, the affidavits were mass produced 
by Barnard in an effort to reargue the case. A "one size fits frlP approach does not work 
with affidavits. See Murdoch v. Springville Mun. Corp., 1999 UT 39, ^ 27, 982 P.2d 65 
(trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking affidavits in which many of the facts 
asserted were not based on personal knowledge, lacked foundation, were conclusory, and 
contained hearsay);Westem States Thrift & Loan Co. v. Blomquist, 504 P.2d 1019, 1021 
(Utah 1972) ("Affidavits containing statements made merely on information and belief 
will be disregarded. Hearsay testimony and opinion testimony that would not be 
admissible if testified to at the trial may not properly be set forth in an affidavit."). The 
trial court recognized the patent deficiencies in plaintiffs' affidavits when it ruled that uall 
are essentially identical and are merely a boilerplate reproduction" and that they 
•'essentially restate[ ] conclusions that are totally inconsistent with the prior rulings of this 
court." (R. at 620). This Court should likewise disregard paragraphs 31 through 49 of 
Barnard's Statement of Relevant Facts, which are premised <^n the defective affidavits. 
memorandum responding to Littrelfs complaints. (R. at 159). This memorandum put 
Littrell and Barnard on notice that plaintiffs* claims lacked njerit. (R. at 663). 
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31-32. In paragraphs 31 and 32, Barnard states that plaintiffs, as concerned 
residents of Ogden City, "participated in this lawsuit because of the importance of the 
issues raised and because of concern for the integrity of the election process/' If 
plaintiffs were truly concerned about the integrity of the election process, they would 
have objected to the process generally rather than targeting Mayor Godfrey in an effort to 
improperly influence the outcome of the mayoral election. Plaintiffs and counsel would 
have also made sure that their position had merit and was supported by the language of 
the ordinance prior to filing their frivolous lawsuit. 
33-34. In these paragraphs. Barnard states that plaintiffs merely sought 
"interpretation of the ordinances'' and "remedies as provided by the Ogden election 
code." These statements are belied by the fundamental nature of plaintiffs' claims. This 
lawsuit was an attempt to smear Mayor Godfrey's reputation and improperly influence the 
outcome of the election. The trial court recognized that the ordinance in question is 
simple and clear on its face and directly conflicts with plaintiffs' position in this 
litigation. (R. at 662-63). 
35. It is true that "the pertinent election was held" on November 6. 2007. 
Despite the efforts of Barnard and his clients. Mayor Godfrey's name was not removed 
from the ballot. 
36-37. In paragraphs 36 and 37. Barnard states that plaintiffs "bear no 
malice nor ill will" toward Mayor Godfrey, or Mansell and Williams for that matter. 
Once again, this statement is in direct conflict with plaintiffs' actions in filing a frivolous 
lawsuit in "an attempt to discredit and remove Matthew Godfrey as a candidate for 
mayor." (R. at 621). 
38-39. Again, Barnard attempts to justify plaintiffs' twisting of the Ogden 
City ordinance. The trial court correctly ruled that plaintiffs' position was entirely 
unsupported by the clear language of the ordinance. The cojirt also ruled that the purpose 
of the ordinance is very simple and clear, and rejected plaintiffs' improper attempt to 
impose additional, unwritten requirements into the ordinance. (R. at 619-622, 658-666). 
Barnard had a legal and ethical obligation to review plaintiffs' position and ensure that it 
was not being asserted for an improper purpose, the claims and contentions were 
warranted by existing law, and the factual allegations had evidentiary support before 
filing the lawsuit. See Rule 11, Utah R. Civ. P. 
40. In this paragraph, Barnard states that plaintiffs' "desire was that all 
candidates fully comply with the city election laws." (Emphasis added). First, based 
upon the plain language of the ordinance, all of the candidates did comply with Ogden 
City's election laws. Second, if plaintiffs were truly concerned about ensuring that the 
ordinance was properly enforced, they would have complainied about the conduct of each 
of the candidates, rather than targeting only Mayor Godfrey. 
41-42. In paragraphs 41 and 42, Barnard implies that plaintiffs did not name 
any of the other candidates in the lawsuit because a lawsuit could only be brought after a 
complaint was received by the City Recorder and plaintiffs were only aware of the 
complaint lodged by Littrell against Mayor Godfrey. In essence, Barnard is arguing that 
because plaintiffs chose to target Mayor Godfrey and nobody else, their hands were tied 
and they could only name Mayor Godfrey in their lawsuit. Tfhis makes absolutely no 
sense. If plaintiffs were truly concerned about ensuring that the ordinance was properly 
enforced, they would have complained to the City Recorder about the conduct of each of 
the candidates. The fact that plaintiffs targeted Mayor Godfrey from the beginning and 
nobody else is further evidence of their bad faith. 
43. Barnard's unsupported opinion or interpretation of the Ogden City 
ordinance is irrelevant and immaterial. The ordinance speaks for itself. 
44. In paragraph 44, Barnard implies that the timing of this lawsuit was 
necessitated by the requirements of the Ogden Municipal Code and plaintiffs' lawsuit 
would have been moot if they had waited until after the election. That is only true to the 
extent that the goal of the litigation was to remove Mayor Godfrey's name from the 
ballot. If plaintiffs were merely seeking an interpretation of the Ogden City ordinance as 
they suggest, then a court could have rendered such a declaration even after the election. 
The timing of plaintiffs' complaints to the City Recorder and the subsequent lawsuit, 
together with the fact that the complaint targeted Mayor Godfrey and no other candidate, 
suggest that plaintiffs acted in bad faith. 
45. In this paragraph, Barnard states that ''plaintiffs sought a declaratory 
judgment by a judge (and not by an appointed city official in the Mayor's administration, 
e.g.. defendant Williams) interpreting and. if appropriate, applying the Ogden City 
election ordinances." This statement is inconsistent with plaintiffs' actions and with the 
vary nature of this lawsuit. If plaintiffs truly wanted to have the city's ordinance 
interpreted, they could have filed a declarator}7 judgment action naming only Ogden City. 
46-49. Despite Barnard's self-serving statements to the contrary, the 
evidence suggests that plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in an effort to tarnish Mayor Godfrey's 
reputation and improperly influence the outcome of the election. (R. at 621). The trial 
court ruled that plaintiffs' position was entirely unsupported by the plain language of the 
ordinance. (R. at 662-63). Moreover, the memorandum prepared by the City Attorney 
put Barnard and his clients on notice that their position was flawed. (R. at 663). Barnard 
also states that "[pjlaintiffs did not intend in any way to improperly impose upon or take 
advantage of any person by filing this lawsuit." To the contrary, the evidence 
demonstrates that this lawsuit was brought in bad faith and for an improper purpose. 
Moreover, Barnard had a legal and ethical obligation to correct plaintiffs' alleged 
misunderstanding prior to filing this lawsuit.7 
50. Barnard's suggestion that "[pjlaintiffs were granted declaratory relief is 
wrong. The trial court flatly "rejected plaintiffs' interpretation of the City ordinance and 
their position in this litigation and . . . determined that plaintiffs' lawsuit was brought 
without merit and in bad faith/' (R. at 620). Rejecting a party's position does not equate 
to granting relief. 
51-54. In paragraphs 51 through 54, Barnard asserts that he "researched the 
law with regard to declaratory judgments prior to filing suit"1 and "determined that under 
Utah law [plaintiffs] had the right to seek a judicial determination as to city ordinances 
regarding municipal elections and campaigns." These statements are in direct conflict 
Paragraphs 46 through 49 are based entirely on the legally defective affidavits of 
the individual plaintiffs. See supra General Response to Paragraphs 31-49. Thus, the 
Court should disregard these factual statements. 
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with the trial court's ruling that "the ordinance in question is simple and clear, and 
plaintiffs' position is entirely unsupported by the plain language of the ordinance and in 
direct conflict with Utah statutory construction law." (R. at 662-63). If Barnard truly 
researched the law prior to filing suit then he should have advised his clients that their 
position was flawed. 
55. On October 11, 2007, counsel for appellees sent Barnard a safe harbor letter 
advising him that they intended to seek Rule 11 sanctions if the frivolous lawsuit was not 
dismissed immediately. (R. at 633, 648). The same day they sent their safe harbor letter, 
appellees also filed a Motion to Dismiss and a Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs, 
seeking attorney's fees and costs under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. (R. at 113-149). 
These filings further outlined the frivolous nature of plaintiffs" lawsuit. 
56. Although "[n]o motion or supporting memorandum was prepared or served 
at that time," counsel for appelleees did serve Barnard with a safe harbor letter advising 
him that they intended to seek Rule 11 sanctions if the case was not dismissed. See supra. 
Counsel for appellees did not have time to follow the formal procedures set forth in Rule 
11 because plaintiffs requested immediate relief and the Court had scheduled an 
expedited hearing for October 23. 2007. (R. at 752). 
57. Barnard is correct that "[l]ess than twenty one (21) days after the warning 
letter, on October 23. 2007. the trial court orally dismissed the complaint." As the trial 
court noted, 'the only reason more time was not allowed to pass was because plaintiffs 
requested an expedited hearing, at which the complaint was involuntarih dismissed/* (R. 
at 84-85. 752). 
58. Paragraph 58 states that "[fjive months later, the City Defendants prepared, 
filed and served a motion for sanctions under Rule 11 with a supporting memorandum." 
In the trial court's ruling awarding Mansell and Williams a portion of their fees and costs 
against the individual plaintiffs, the trial court noted that u[fjhis result does not preclude 
the parties from requesting sanctions under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure." (R. at 622, 664). Acting upon the trial court's ihvitation, on March 31, 2008, 
appellees filed their formal Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions against Barnard. (R. at 631-
651). 
59. In paragraph 59, Barnard acknowledges that the trial court imposed 
sanctions upon him in the amount of $10,000 in favor of Mansell and Williams. This 
amount represents only a portion of the fees and costs reasonably incurred by Mansell and 
Williams in defending this frivolous lawsuit. (R. at 767). 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly imposed Rule 11 sanctions against Barnard in the amount 
of $10,000. Despite Barnard's arguments to the contrary, appellees substantially 
complied with the procedural safe harbor requirements of Ri^ ile 11, and any failure to do 
so was the direct result of Barnard's request for an expedited schedule. The trial court 
also made detailed findings of fact to support its imposition Of Rule 11 sanctions. 
Barnard failed to properly challenge those factual findings. Therefore, the Court should 
affirm the trial court's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions against Barnard and award 
appellees their attorney's fees and costs incurred on appeal. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY IMPOSED SANCTION S AGAINST 
BARNARD PURSUANT TO RULE 11 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE. 
Plaintiffs filed a vindictive, frivolous, bad faith lawsuit for political purposes. 
Under Rule 11, Barnard had a duty to ensure that this did not occur. At a minimum, he 
should not have participated in the process. By signing and filing the Complaint and 
other related pleadings, which were entirely unsupported by the plain language of the 
relevant ordinance and in direct conflict with Utah statutory construction law, Barnard 
violated his Rule 11 obligations. Barnard was warned and put on notice that plaintiffs' 
claims were entirely without merit and that appellees intended to seek Rule 11 sanctions. 
Yet, he elected to ignore those warnings and push forward with the lawsuit on an 
expedited basis. Now, Barnard is attempting to hide behind the procedural requirements 
of Rule 11. As the trial court properly ruled, however, appellees substantially complied 
with the procedural requirements of Rule 11. To the extent that there were any 
shortcomings, they were the direct result of Barnard* s request for an expedited schedule. 
1. Barnard's Conduct Warranted Sanctions Under Rule 11. 
Under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, an attorney's signature on a 
pleading certifies, among other things, that "it is not being presented for any improper 
purpose** and that "the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted 
by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal 
of existing law or the establishment of new law." See Rule 11(b). Utah R. Civ. P. After 
careful analysis of the relevant facts and law, the trial court determined that this was a 
"vindictive, frivolous, bad faith lawsuit" that was intended Ito discredit and remove 
Matthew Godfrey as a candidate for mayor." (R. at 621, 663-34). As a result, the trial 
court awarded defendants a portion of their attorney's fees ^nd costs against the plaintiffs 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. The court also determined that Barnard should 
shoulder a portion of the burden caused by this frivolous lawsuit and imposed $10,000 in 
Rule 11 sanctions against him. 
As shown previously, there was no legal basis for the position advocated by the 
plaintiffs in this case. Plaintiffs' position was premised on gin obvious misinterpretation 
of the relevant ordinance. This fact was made explicitly clear by Gary Williams, the 
Ogden City Attorney, before the lawsuit was ever filed. Williams reviewed LittrelPs 
complaints regarding Mayor Godfrey's alleged noncompliance and found them to be 
entirely without merit. Williams analyzed and explained hisi decision in a memorandum 
dated September 26, 2007, a copy of which was provided toLittrell on September 28, 
2007, three days before this lawsuit was filed. Despite receiving this information, 
plaintiffs chose to file their frivolous Complaint and Motioni for Immediate Injunction and 
Extraordinary Writ, forcing defendants to incur legal fees and expenses. 
Barnard, as counsel for the plaintiffs, had a duty to advise his clients that their 
position was entirely unsupported by the plain language of tljie ordinance and in direct 
conflict with Utah statutory construction law.8 Additionally ^  on October 5, 2007. in a 
8Barnard*s position was in conflict with several well-established rules of statutory 
construction. First, if the language of an ordinance is plain and unambiguous, courts will 
telephone conversation with counsel for appellees, Barnard confirmed that he had 
received the City Attorney's memorandum prior to filing the Complaint. (R. at 645-46). 
There is no evidence to suggest that Barnard advised the plaintiffs that their position was 
flawed. (R. at 621-22) ("None of the twenty plaintiffs who signed identical affidavits 
apparently reviewed the memorandum prepared by their City Attorney which put them on 
notice that their position was flawed. None have informed the court that their counsel 
reviewed the memorandum of the City Attorney or were given the opportunity to correct 
their misunderstanding of the plain language of the ordinance prior to the filing of the 
not look beyond the express language to determine legislative intent. See, e.g., Brendle v. 
City of Draper, 937 P.2d 1044. 1047 (Utah Ct. App., 1997) ("Where statutory language is 
plain and unambiguous, this Court will not look beyond the same to divine legislative 
intent/'); Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 2003 UT 16, % 18. 70 P.3d 47. Second, the Utah 
Supreme Court has held that "[w]hen interpreting a statute, this court looks first to the 
statute's plain language to determine the Legislature's intent and purpose/' Miller v. 
Weaver. 2003 UT 12. ^ j 17, 66 P.3d 592. Stated differently, a court's "objective in 
interpreting a statute is to effectuate legislative intent, and that intent is most readily 
ascertainable by looking to the plain language of the statute/' Olseth v. Larson, 2007 UT 
29, |^ 23. 158 P.3d 532. Third, Utah courts have rejected attempts to infer new and/or 
additional terms into an ordinance that are not supported by the express language of the 
ordinance. See, e.g., Associated General Contractors v. Board of Oil Gas and Mining, 
2001 UT 112, H 30. 38 P.3d 291 ("Indeed, we will not 'infer substantive terms into the 
text that are not already there. Rather, the interpretation must be based on the language 
used, and [we have] no power to rewrite the statute to conform to an intention not 
expressed/"); Wood v. Labor Comm';?. 2005 UT App 490, % 10. 128 P.3d 41 ("we will 
not infer substantive tenns into the text of the statute"). These well-established principles 
of statutory construction, as well as the unambiguous language of the Ogden City 
ordinance, which expressly imposes certain requirements but does not impose the 
requirements that Barnard argued should be added to the ordinance, establish that it was 
the Ogden City Council's intent not to impose Barnard's suggested requirements upon 
the candidates. See, e.g., Cullum v. Farmers Ins. Exchange. 857 P.2d 922. 924 (Utah 
1993) (referring to "The maxim 'expressio unius est exclusio alteriusS that is. "the 
expression of one thing is the exclusion of another/" as an "aid to statutory 
interpretation."). Thus, the trial court property rejected the misguided efforts of Barnard 
and his clients to unilateralh rewrite the Osden Cit\ ordinance. 
lawsuit."). 
Perhaps most importantly, on or about October 11, 2007, counsel for appellees sent 
Barnard a safe harbor letter advising him that they intended to seek Rule 11 sanctions if 
plaintiffs' frivolous lawsuit was not dismissed. The letter stated as follows: 
Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure we hereby provide 
notice that we intend to file a motion for sanctions against you and the Utah 
Legal Clinic, Inc. The position being advocated by your clients in the 
above-referenced case is not supported by the relevant facts or applicable 
law, and appears to be aimed at improperly influencing the outcome of the 
upcoming mayoral election. The frivolous nature of jhe lawsuit is 
demonstrated by the Motion to Dismiss, Motion for Attorney's Fees and 
Costs and the consolidated supporting memorandum mat we have filed with 
the Court, which had to be filed immediately given the expedited relief 
sought by your clients. We will hold off filing a formal Rule 11 motion 
until expiration of the 21 day safe harbor deadline. Ii the Complaint has not 
been voluntarily withdrawn before then, we will proceed to file our Rule 11 
motion. 
(R. at 648). Barnard rejected this warning and pushed forward with the frivolous lawsuit 
at defendants' expense. It is significant to note at the same time counsel for appellees 
sent their safe harbor letter, they also filed their Consolidated Memorandum in Support of 
Defendants' Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs, which s t^ forth in detail the 
deficiencies in plaintiffs' position. 
Barnard had numerous opportunities to exercise discretion and comply with his 
obligations under Rule 11. First, he should have reviewed the facts, researched the 
applicable law, and advised the plaintiffs accordingly, prior to filing suit. Second, he 
should have advised the plaintiffs that their position was flawed when he reviewed the 
memorandum prepared by the Ogden City Attorney addressing Littrelfs prior complaints. 
Finally, after receiving counsel's safe harbor letter, he should have advised the plaintiffs 
to withdraw their complaint, and if they refused, he should have filed a motion to 
withdraw as counsel. Barnard failed at each turn to comply with his Rule 11 obligations. 
In fact, even after the trial court dismissed plaintiffs' lawsuit with prejudice and granted 
defendants' Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs at the conclusion of the October 23, 
2007 hearing, Barnard and his clients pressed forward and filed a flurry of pleadings and 
affidavits challenging the very issues that had already been determined by the Court. (R. 
at 620) ("Plaintiffs argue that the court should not award any fees because their 
complaint had merit, was not frivolous, and was not filed in bad faith. The Court already 
rejected plaintiffs' interpretation of the City ordinance and their position in the litigation 
and has already determined that plaintiffs' lawsuit was brought without merit and in bad 
faith. . . . Rather than address the present issues, the affidavit essentially restates 
conclusions that are totally inconsistent with the prior rulings of the court."). This 
strategy forced defendants to continue to incur additional attorney's fees and costs in 
responding to plaintiffs' pleadings. 
In summary, plaintiffs filed a "vindictive, frivolous, bad faith" lawsuit for political 
purposes. Under Rule 11, Barnard had a duty to ensure that this did not occur. At a 
minimum, he should not have participated in the process. By signing and filing the 
Complaint and other related pleadings, which were entirely unsupported by the plain 
language of the relevant ordinance and in direct conflict with Utah statutory construction 
law, Barnard violated his Rule 11 obligations. 
2. Mansell And Williams Substantially Complied With The Procedural 
Requirements Of Rule 11. 
In an effort to avoid responsibility for his Rule 11 vidlations, Barnard argues that 
appellees failed to comply with the procedural safe harbor requirements of Rule 
11(c)(1)(A), Utah R. Civ. P. First, Barnard argues that the s&fe harbor letter sent by 
counsel for appellees was not a formal Rule 11 motion as required by Rule 11(c)(1)(A). 
Second, Barnard argues that he was not provided the twenty+one (21) day safe harbor 
period within which to withdraw his pleadings because plaintiffs' Complaint was 
dismissed at the conclusion of the October 23, 2007 hearing. Finally, Barnard argues that 
appellees' formal Rule 11 Motion was not filed until after the case was dismissed. As 
will be shown below, however, appellees substantially complied with the safe harbor 
requirements of Rule 11, and to the extent that there were a% shortcomings, they were 
the direct result of Barnard's request that the case be heard qn an immediate and 
expedited basis. 
Although Barnard argues that appellees failed to serve their Rule 11 motion on 
him prior to filing it with the trial court as required by Rule \ 1(c)(1)(A), he does not deny 
that he received a safe harbor letter advising him that appellees intended to seek Rule 11 
sanctions if the frivolous lawsuit was not dismissed. See Baifnard's Brief at 26. (R. at 
648). Barnard argues that "Rule 11 requires a written motion and a supporting 
memorandum" and appellees "never timely prepared nor seryed [such] a motion." 
Barnard's Brief at 26. 
This argument ignores substantial authority that "noncompliance that is merely 
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technical in nature does not foreclose sanctions if the party has substantially complied 
with the safe-harbor provision." 2 James William Moore, et al.5 Moore's Federal 
Practice % 11.22[l][b] (3rd ed. 2006). For instance, in Barker v. Bank One, 156 F.3d 1228 
(Table) (6th Cir. 1998). the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed an award of Rule 11 
sanctions based upon facts similar to the present case. The court held that *wthe purpose of 
the safe harbor provision was complied with in this case by the warning letters [counsel 
for plaintiff] received. He elected not to avail himself of the safe harbor." Id. at *2. 
Likewise, in Nisenbaum v Milwaukee County, 333 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2003), the Seventh 
Circuit ordered Rule 11 sanctions where counsel sent a 'letter" or "demand'' rather than a 
''motion" on the basis that defendants "complied substantially with Rule 11(c)(1)(A)."9 
Id. at 808. Thus, appellees complied with the purpose of the safe harbor provisions by 
sending their October 11, 2007 safe harbor letter. 
In a related argument, Barnard argues that he w as not afforded the required 21 
days to withdraw his pleadings as required by Rule 11(c)(1)(A) because the trial court 
dismissed plaintiffs' claims with prejudice at the conclusion of the October 23. 2007 
hearing, just twelve days after appellees sent their safe harbor letter. See Barnard's Brief 
at 26-28. There are two problems with this argument. First as explained above, a 
9Barnard cites two cases that are critical of the Nisenbaum decision on the grounds 
that the Se\ enth Circuit pro\ ided little analysis for its decision. See Barnard's Brief at 
24. Nevertheless, the holding of Nisenbaum that defendants "substantiall) complied with 
Rule 11(c)(1)(A)" b} sending a "Tetter' or 'demand* rather than a "motion""" remains 
good law. Additionally, neither of the cases relied upon by Barnard involve a situation 
where the violating attorne} requested expedited relief, which precluded strict compliance 
with the safe harbor provisions of Rule 11. See Roth v Green. 466 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 
2006): In re Jack E Pratt. 524 F.3d 580 (5th Cir. 2008). 
violating party cannot avoid Rule 11 sanctions based upon a mere technicality. Second, 
Barnard's request for an immediate injunction and an immediate hearing precluded 
appellees from complying with the 21 day requirement of Riile 11(c)(1)(A). Plaintiffs 
filed their lawsuit on October 1, 2007, and the trial court conducted its expedited hearing 
on October 23, 2007. By the time counsel for appellees had an opportunity to review the 
relevant facts and applicable law, there was no opportunity to serve counsel with a formal 
Rule 11 motion and provide 21 days notice. As a result, counsel for the appellees acted 
quickly and reasonably, and sent Barnard a safe harbor letter on October 11, 2007, just 
ten days after the lawsuit was filed. Barnard had ample opportunity to avail himself of 
the safe harbor prior to the October 23rd hearing but chose not to. Barnard cannot request 
immediate injunctive relief and then use the expedited process he requested as a defense 
to defendants' Rule 11 motion. See, e.g, Methode Electronics, Inc. v. Adam 
Technologies, Inc., 371 F.3d 923, 927 (7th Cir. 2004) ("As in many cases involving a 
request for preliminary relief, blind adherence to the procedures in Rule 11 is not 
possible. Events often move too fast to allow strict compliance with the rule."). 
Finally, Barnard argues that a "Rule 11 motion served and filed after the 
underlying case has been dismissed must be denied." Barnard's Brief at 28. Once again, 
however, appellees were denied the opportunity to fully comjply with Rule 11 due to the 
expedited timetable requested by Barnard. The trial court scheduled the October 23rd 
hearing in response to plaintiffs' request for immediate injunctive relief and an immediate 
hearing. Logically, the trial court also heard defendants' related motions at the same 
time. Barnard should not be allowed to file a frivolous, bad faith lawsuit and then use his 
own request for immediate and expedited relief to shield himself from the consequences 
of Rule 11. See Methode Electronics, 371 F.3d at 927 ("When [plaintiff] proceeded with 
the hearing, it, in effect, rejected the warning. And at that point, [defendants] had no 
opportunity to file their motion and were prevented by the speed of events from granting a 
21-day period to withdraw the allegation.'*).10 
Barnard has cited a series of cases in support of his argument that a party must 
strictly comply with the procedural requirements of Rule 11. Barnard's Brief at 20-23. 
However, none of those cases are from Utah courts because, as Barnard notes, u[n]o 
reported Utah cases have ruled on the Rule 11 procedures involved in this case." Id. at 
20. Not only are the decisions cited by Barnard nonbinding on this Court but they are 
also easily distinguishable. None of the decisions cited by Barnard address the situation 
faced here-where the violating party's request for expedited relief prevented the other 
party from strictly complying with Rule 1 Us procedural requirements. As stated by the 
trial court. "Barnard cannot. . . use the expedited timetable that he requested as a shield 
against Rule 11 sanctions." (R. at 752). 
In summary, appellees complied with the purpose and intent of the safe harbor 
provisions of Rule 11. To the extent that there w ere any shortcomings, they were the 
10Barnard has also tried to distinguish the Seventh Circuit's decision in Methode 
Electronics, Inc. v. Adam Technologies, Inc . 371 F.3d 923. 927 (7th Cir. 2004). by 
arguing that the appellate court ultimately "held that the award was sustainable as an 
imposition of sanctions within the Court" s inherent power and not under Rule 11." 
Barnard's Brief at 24. In addition to affirming the trial court's ruling that appellees 
substantially complied with Rule 11. this Court can also uphold the trial court's 
imposition of sanctions against Barnard as an exercise of its inherent powers. See infra p. 
31.ii.ll. 
direct result of Barnard's request for immediate injunctive relief and an immediate 
hearing.11 
3. The Trial Court Made Detailed Factual Findings Supporting Its 
Imposition Of Rule 11 Sanctions. 
Barnard also argues that the trial court failed to make sufficient factual findings to 
support its imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. See Barnard's Brief at 30-38. In making this 
argument, Barnard has adopted a one-sided view of the trial Court's rulings and elected to 
ignore anything that does not support his position. Under Utah law, "a trial court [must] 
make a series of specific factual findings as a predicate for concluding that [Rule 11] has 
been violated, and then must determine the appropriate sanction." Griffith v. Griffith, 
1999 UT 78, ^  10, 985 P.2d 255. That is exactly what occurred in this case. A simple 
review of the trial court rulings12 reveals detailed and specific factual findings supporting 
nIn the event that the Court were to determine that Rule 11 sanctions were not 
available due to appellees' inability to strictly comply with the safe harbor requirements 
of Rule 11(c)(1)(A), the Court should still affirm the imposition of sanctions against 
Barnard as a proper exercise of the trial court's inherent equitable powers and authority. 
This issue was raised in the trial court (R. at 724-26), and this Court "may affirm a grant 
of sanctions on any basis supported by the record and the law/' Divane v. Krull Elec. 
Co., 200 F.3d 1020. 1026 (7th Cir. 1999); accord Salt Lake County v. Metro West Ready 
Mix, Inc., 2004 UT 23, Tj 21, 89 P.3d 155 (u[A]n appellate court may affirm a trial court's 
ruling on any proper grounds, even though the trial court relied on some other ground."); 
Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 276 (Utah 1982) ("Furthermore, we 
may affirm a trial court's decision on proper grounds even though different than those 
relied upon by the trial court."). Barnard should not be permitted to avoid responsibility 
for his Rule 11 violations based upon a mere technicality. 
12The trial court issued four separate rulings that bear on the issue of Rule 11 
sanctions. On June 26, 2008. the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision imposing 
Rule 11 sanctions upon Barnard. (R. at 748-754). Then, on July 29, 2008. the trial court 
signed its final order requiring Barnard to pay $10,000 in Rule 11 sanctions to Mansell 
and Williams. (R. at 763-770). In its July 29th Order, however, the trial court also 
the trial court's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions, including, but not limited to, the 
following: 
"On or about October 1, 2007, [pjlaintiffs, through Mr. Barnard, filed their 
Complaint and Motion for Immediate Injunction and Extraordinary Writ, seeking 
to have Mayor Godfrey's name removed from the ballot in the November 2007 
election." (R. at 749, 764). 
"On or about October 11, 2007, counsel for Ogden City Defendants sent 
Mr. Barnard a letter advising him that they intended to seek Rule 11 sanctions 
against him if he pursued the action. Mr. Barnard elected to press forward with the 
lawsuit." (R. at 749, 764-65). 
• "At the conclusion of the [October 23rd] hearing, the [c]ourt dismissed 
[plaintiffs' Complaint, finding that it was frivolous and had been filed in bad 
faith, justifying an award of attorney's fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56." 
(R. at 765). 
"The [cjourt specifically determined that the plaintiffs' lawsuit was without 
merit. This determination was based upon the fact that the ordinance in question is 
simple and clear, and plaintiffs' position is entirely unsupported by the plain 
language of the ordinance and in direct conflict with Utah statutory construction 
law. Stated differently, plaintiffs' lawsuit was frivolous and had no basis in law or 
fact." (R. at 662-63). 
"Mayor Godfrey established a personal campaign committee (UPCC"), 
which was named 'People to Re-Elect Matthew Godfrey,' as was required by 
Ogden Municipal Code § 1-8-2A and C." (R. at 661). 
"Mayor Godfrey registered his PCC with the City Recorder as required by 
Subsection 1-8-2D of the Ogden Municipal Code. The registration form that 
Mayor Godfrey filed with the City Recorder was prepared and provided by the 
City and satisfied the minimal requirements of Subsection 1-8-2D. It was (1) 'a 
written statement' (2) 'signed by the candidate,' (3) 'setting forth that the 
candidate's personal campaign committee has been appointed or elected/ and (4) 
'giving the name and address of each member and the secretary of the committee/ 
Ogden Municipal Code § 1-8-2D. The ordinance does not require that the name of 
the candidate's PCC be listed on the registration form." (R. at 661). 
"Mayor Godfrey filed the necessary financial statements with the City 
Recorder as required by Section 1-8-4 of the Ogden Municipal Code. That filing 
adopted and incorporated its related February 29. 2008 Memorandum Decision (R. at 
619-623) and its April 8. 2008 Order (R. at 658-666). wherein it awarded Mansell and 
Williams a portion of their attorney's fees and costs against the individual plaintiffs 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. (R. at 765). All four of these rulings contain 
specific factual findings supporting the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. 
was made in a timely manner on forms prepared and provided by the City, and 
complied with the requirements of Section 1-8-4. Mayor Godfrey was not required 
to provide the name of his PCC on his financial statements. Rather Section 1-8-4B 
states that the financial statement shall be filed by the 'candidate or political 
campaign committee.''' (R. at 661). 
"Contrary to plaintiffs' position, the ordinance did not require that 
registration and financial statements set forth the specific name of the candidate's 
PCC. Rather, the ordinance is very clear and simple and places the responsibility 
to make such filings on the candidate." (R. at 662). 
"The [c]ourt... rejected plaintiffs' interpretation of the City ordinance and 
their position in the litigation and has already determined that plaintiffs' lawsuit 
was brought without merit and in bad faith." (R. at 620). 
"Unlike many cases, plaintiffs' claims were reviewed, analyzed and 
appropriately rejected by the Ogden City Attorney before this lawsuit was filed. 
The Court reviewed the City Attorney's memorandum addressing plaintiff Dorothy 
Littrelfs complaints and found the memorandum to be accurate and on point. The 
City Attorney's memorandum put plaintiffs on notice that their position lacked any 
merit." (R. at 663). 
• "Additionally, the timing of plaintiffs' lawsuit (filed just weeks before the 
general election) and the fact that plaintiffs targeted only Mayor Godfrey in their 
lawsuit (even though he used the same forms as every other candidate and no other 
candidate listed the name of their PCC on their registration and financial 
statements) further demonstrate that plaintiffs filed their lawsuit in bad faith and in 
an effort to improperly influence the outcome of the election." (R. at 663). 
"These facts all establish that (1) plaintiffs lacked an honest belief in the 
propriety of their actions; (2) plaintiffs intended to talj:e unconscionable advantage 
of the defendants through their actions; and (3) the plaintiffs intended to 
improperly influence the outcome of the mayoral election through their actions." 
(R. at 663). 
"This lawsuit was not about interpreting an ordinance and having all the 
candidates removed from the ballot because of their failure to make disclosures. It 
was an attempt to discredit and remove Matthew Godfrey as a candidate for 
mayor." (R. at 621). 
"This lawsuit was not about interpreting and fairly enforcing the City's 
election ordinances as to all mayoral candidates. It was an attempt to discredit one 
particular candidate in an attempt to influence the upcoming election." (R. at 750, 
765). 
"As to the 21-day requirement of Rule 11(c)(1)(A), the court notes that Mr. 
Barnard had 12 days to withdraw his complaint before the hearing on October 23. 
This was enough time for Mr. Barnard to consider the possibility of sanctions, and 
when he and his clients proceeded with the hearing, they effectively rejected the 
warning." (R. at 751). 
"The court also notes that the only reason more time was not allowed to 
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pass was because [pjlaintiffs requested an expedited hearing, at which the 
complaint was involuntarily dismissed. Mr. Barnard cannot now use the expedited 
timetable that he requested as a shield against Rule 11 sanctions." (R. at 752). 
"The judicial system should not be used for political and vindictive 
purposes and plaintiffs and their attorneys have a duty to make sure that a lawsuit 
has merit and is brought in good faith. Filing frivolous non-meritorious lawsuits 
targeting a person running for a public office should be chilled." (R. at 621). 
"The challenge in this case is a group of plaintiffs who have been recruited 
to participate in this lawsuit who are now facing participation in a judgment for 
substantial attorney fees." (R. at 621). 
• "[TJhe [cjourt believes that the majority of the plaintiffs did not understand 
the consequences of filing this vindictive, frivolous, bad faith lawsuit." (R. at 663-
64). 
"Other than the affidavit of the lead plaintiff, Dorothy E. Littrell, 
[p]laintiff s counsel filed 20 affidavits that are all essentially identical and are 
merely a boiler plate production.. . . Rather than address the present issues, the 
affidavit essentially restates conclusions that are totally inconsistent with the prior 
rulings of this court." (R. at 620). 
"Approximately one-third of those plaintiffs have signed an identical 
affidavit informing the court that they had the exact same feeling about filing the 
lawsuit, went through the exact same process of reviewing the ordinance, and 
reached exactly the same conclusions." (R. at 621). 
"None of the twenty plaintiffs who signed identical affidavits apparently 
reviewed the memorandum prepared by their City Attorney which put them on 
notice that their position was flawed. None have informed the court that their 
counsel reviewed the memorandum of the City Attorney or were given the 
opportunity to correct their misunderstanding of the plain language of the 
ordinance prior to the filing of the lawsuit. Not one of the twenty plaintiffs 
informed the court by way of affidavit that their attorney had been put on notice 
that the [djefendants would be seeking attorney fees if the lawsuit was not 
voluntarily withdrawn and decided to proceed notwithstanding the risk of a 
substantial award of attorney fees." (R. at 621-22). 
• "This [cjourt does not believe that the vast majority of the plaintiffs in this 
case had any idea of the consequences of filing this vindictive, frivolous, bad faith 
action." (R. at 622). 
• "This case was an abuse of the judicial process, and the court concludes that 
it was filed for an improper purpose within the meaning of Rule 11(b)(1). Because 
this lawsuit was frivolous and filed in bad faith and for an improper purpose, the 
court concludes that Mr. Barnard has violated subdivisions (1) and (2) of Rule 
11(b)." (R. at 750). 
"The [cjourt imposes a sanction on Mr. Barnard in the amount of $10,000. 
payable to [djefendants Mansell and Williams. The [cjourt finds this amount to be 
fair and reasonable in light of the fact that it is only a portion of the fees and costs 
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that the Ogden City Defendants reasonable incurred in their effort to defend 
against this frivolous lawsuit." (R. at 766). 
These factual findings are more than sufficient to support the trial court's 
imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. In Griffith, a case cited by Barnard, the trial court made 
the following one-paragraph finding in support of Rule 11 sanctions: 
Plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify Defendant's Attorney filed on January 4, 
1996, was not well grounded in fact or warranted by existing law or a good 
faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law, 
and was filed for an improper purpose to harass Defendant and cause 
unnecessary delay and needless increase in the costs of litigation. 
Griffith 1999 UT 78, *{ 10. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held that this factual 
finding "simply paraphrasing the language of rule 11, and standing by itself without any 
detailed factual findings particularizing its conclusions is insufficiently specific as a 
matter of law to support the imposition of rule 11 sanctions." Id. In stark contrast, the 
trial court in this matter made detailed factual findings supporting Barnard's violation of 
Rule ll.13 See supra. 
Barnard also argues that c*[t]he court below made no findings and included no 
discussion as to how or why it determined an award of fees Was appropriate or that ten 
thousand dollars ($10,000) was an appropriate amount." Barnard's Brief at 33. Once 
again, Barnard has ignored the plain language of the lower court's rulings. The trial court 
specifically found as follows: "The [c]ourt imposes a sanction on Mr. Barnard in the 
13To the extent that Barnard is attempting to challenge any specific finding of fact, 
the appropriate standard of review is the clearly erroneous standard. See Griffith 1999 
UT 78, ^ j 10. "This standard affords great deference to the trial court because it is in the 
best position to . . . 'gain a sense of the proceedings as a whole/" Morse v. Packer. 1999 
UT 5. J 1 L 973 P.2d 422 (citation omitted). 
amount of $10,000, payable to [djefendants Mansell and Williams. The [c]ourt finds this 
amount to be fair and reasonable in light of the fact that it is only a portion of the fees and 
costs that the Ogden City Defendants reasonable incurred in their effort to defend against 
this frivolous lawsuit." (R. at 766). This factual finding is sufficient 1O support the trial 
court's imposition of sanctions in the amount of $10,000.14 
In sum, the trial court's decision to impose Rule 11 sanctions against Barnard is 
adequately supported with detailed factual findings.1^ 
4. Barnard Has Not Properly Challenged The Facts Supporting The 
Imposition Of Rule 11 Sanctions. 
As with his prior arguments, Barnard baldly asserts that there are no facts to 
support the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. See Barnard's Brief at 28. Barnard has 
made no effort whatsoever to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings. 
'In order to establish that findings of fact are clearly erroneous. ;[a]n appellant must 
marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this 
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear 
14
"[T]he type and amount of sanction to be imposed is reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard." Morse. 1999 UT 5. T 10: accord Griffith. 1999 UT 78. % 10. 
lsBarnard spent several pages discussing the findings of fact underlying the trial 
court's imposition of attorney's fees and costs against the individual plaintiffs pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. See Barnard's Brief at 33-38. Ho\*e\ er. plaintiffs did not 
appeal from those rulings. (R. at 778-780). To the extent that the trial court incorporated 
its prior rulings awarding fees and costs against the individual plaintiffs into its rulings 
imposing Rule 11 sanctions against Barnard, those specific factual findings have been 
addressed above. See supra § VI.A.3. The trial court made detailed and specific factual 
findings to support its ultimate conclusions. Moreover. Barnard has not even attempted 
to marshal the evidence in support of those findings. See infra § VI.A.4. 
weight of the evidence.' 'If the evidence is inadequately marshaled, this court assumes 
that all findings are adequately supported by the evidence.'" Cache County v. Beus, 2005 
UT App 503, Tf 6, 128 P.3d 63 (citation omitted). Moreover, a party does not meet its 
burden to marshal by simply listing evidence for and against its position: 
The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's advocate. 
Counsel must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully 
assume the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the duty of 
marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and 
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial 
which supports the very findings the appellant resists. After constructing 
this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out 
a fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to 
convince the appellate court that the [trial] court's finding resting upon the 
evidence is clearly erroneous. 
Harris v. IES Associates, Inc., 2003 UT App 112, % 39, 69 P.3d 297. 
Although Barnard apparently recognizes his duty to marshal the evidence in 
support of the trial court's numerous and detailed factual findings he made no effort to 
fulfill that duty. See Barnard's Brief at 31 (citing Still Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen, 
2005 UT 46, «f 8 n.2, 122 P.3d 556 ("When challenging a district court's findings of fact, 
the challenging party must show that the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the 
[district] court, is legally insufficient to support the contested finding."). Instead, Barnard 
merely argues that wi[t]he facts which were presented to and considered by the trial court 
are very limited." Barnard's Brief at 31 n.l 1. Therefore, the Court should disregard 
Barnard's argument that there are no facts to support the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. 
B. BARNARD'S ARGUMENT THAT HIS CLIENTS WERE MERELY 
SEEKING DECLARATORY RELIEF PROVIDED BY THE 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT IS A "RED HERRING." 
Throughout his brief. Barnard argues that plaintiffs were merely seeking 
declaratory relief pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act. See, e.g., Barnard's Brief at 
5, 7-8, 16, 18, 29, 38-41, 44, 49. Barnard even goes so far as to argue that "[p]laintiffs 
were granted declaratory relief because the trial court reviewed and interpreted the 
Ogden City ordinances. See Barnard's Brief at 5, 16, 44. These arguments are entirely 
without merit and are intended to draw the Court's attention away from the fact that 
Barnard and his clients filed a "vindictive, frivolous, bad faith lawsuit" that was intended 
to "discredit and remove Matthew Godfrey as a candidate for mayor." (R. at 620-22, 662-
64). The Court should disregard this obvious "red herring" for the following reasons: 
First, Barnard states that "[t]his action was brought in good faith and sought the 
relief provided by the Utah Declaratory Judgment Act." Barnard's Brief at 18. This 
statement, however, is inconsistent with the actions of Barnard and his clients, and with 
the vary nature of this lawsuit. If plaintiffs truly wanted to have the Ogden City 
ordinance interpreted, they could have filed a simple declaratory judgment action naming 
only Ogden City. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-2 (2007). Instead. Barnard and his clients 
chose to target Mayor Godfrey, while ignoring the fact, of which the}7 were well aware, 
that ever}7 other candidate was also allegedly in violation of the ordinance based upon 
plaintiffs' incorrect interpretation. 
Second. Barnard's suggestion that the trial court actually granted plaintiffs 
declarator}7 relief is also wrong. The trial court flatly "rejected plaintiffs' interpretation of 
the City ordinance and their position in this litigation." (R. at 620). In fact, the trial court 
determined that ^plaintiffs' position is entirely unsupported tfy the plain language of the 
ordinance and in direct conflict with Utah statutory construction law." (R. at 662-63). 
Outrightly rejecting a party's position does not equate to granting relief. 
Third, Barnard argues u[p]laintiffs should not be penalized for utilizing that statute 
in the exact manner and for the exact purpose for which it was enacted." Barnard's Brief 
at 29. This argument is of no avail to Barnard who filed a frivolous lawsuit in an effort to 
improperly influence the outcome of the mayoral election. There is no exception under 
Rule 11 for vindictive, frivolous, bad faith declaratory judgment actions. 
Finally, it should be noted that the trial court had the authority and discretion to 
award appellees their entire attorney's fees and costs incurred in this frivolous lawsuit 
under the express provisions of the Utah Declaratory Judgment Act. Utah Code Ann. § 
78-33-10 provides that "[i]n any proceeding under this chapter the court may make such 
award of costs as may seem equitable and just." In Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. 
MarchanU 615 P.2d 423 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court stated the following with 
regard to Section 10 of the Declaratory Judgment Act: wwwe have no doubt that the 
statutory authorization to award such 'costs as may seem equitable and just' may include 
an award of attorney's fees if they were necessarily incurred because of litigation which 
was not resorted to in good faith, but was merely spiteful contentious or obstructive." Id. 
dXAll'. Rather than awarding the entire amount of fees and costs incurred by defendants 
in defending this lawsuit under Section 78-33-10, the trial court chose to award 
defendants a portion of their fees and costs reasonably incurred under Section 78-27-56 
and Rule 11. This was more than reasonable given the "vindictive, frivolous, bad faith*' 
nature of this lawsuit. 
C. BARNARD'S OTHER ARGUMENTS ARE LIKEWISE WITHOUT 
MERIT. 
1. Plaintiffs Were Provided An Opportunity To Respond To Defendants' 
Motions For Attorney's Fees And Costs. 
In a further effort to avoid the consequences of his actions. Barnard argues that the 
trial court granted defendants' Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs '"without giving 
plaintiffs an opportunity to respond." Barnard's Brief at 39-40. To the extent that 
Barnard is attempting to challenge the trial court's February 29, 2008 Memorandum 
Decision (R. at 619-623) and April 8, 2008 Order (R. at 658-666), wherein it awarded 
appellees a portion of their attorney's fees and costs against the individual plaintiffs 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. it should be noted that Barnard lacks standing to 
challenge those rulings. Those two rulings awarded attorney's fees arid costs against the 
individual plaintiffs for violating Section 78-27-56, not Barnard, and plaintiffs did not 
appeal from such rulings. Although Barnard has standing to challenge the imposition of 
Rule 11 sanctions against him. he cannot challenge the award of fees and costs against his 
clients.16 See Motion for Partial Summary Disposition and related memoranda dated 
October 14, 2008. 
16Under Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Barnard lacks standing to 
challenge in his own personal name the trial court's orders awarding attorney's fees 
against the individual plaintiffs. See An glum v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co . 166 P.3d 191. 193 
(Colo. Ct. App. 2007) (the notice of appeal must be filed in the name of the real part}7 in 
interest). 
Even if Barnard had standing to challenge the trial court's award of fees and costs 
against the individual plaintiffs, his assertion that he was not, provided an opportunity to 
respond to defendants' Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs is simply not true. Barnard 
filed a Complaint and Motion for Immediate Injunction and Extraordinary Writ on 
October 1, 2007. He also requested an expedited and immediate hearing on the matter. 
(R. at 1-85). Counsel for appellees worked feverishly to file their motion to dismiss, a 
motion for expedited briefing and hearing, and a motion for an award of attorney's fees 
on October 11, 2007. (R. at 113-149). Appellees requested that their motions be heard at 
the same time. (R. at 104-112, 802 pp. 19-20). 
Although the normal deadline for plaintiffs to respond to Mansell and Williams' 
Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs would not have occurred until after the October 23, 
2007 hearing, the clerk informed the parties that the trial court intended to hear all 
pending motions during the October 23rd hearing. (R. at 110). The trial court also asked 
the parties to work out a briefing schedule that would allow both parties an opportunity to 
brief their motions prior to the hearing. (R. at 289). Despite defendants' repeated efforts 
to contact Barnard in an effort to work out a briefing schedule leading up to the October 
23rd hearing, Barnard ignored counsel and strung them along until the day before the 
expedited hearing to file his responsive memoranda. (R. at 232-282, 283-85, 286-87, 
289). Barnard also waited until just prior to the October 23rd hearing to file his Notice 
Re: Plaintiffs* Response to Motion for Fees, wherein Barnard unilaterally informed the 
trial court that he would not be responding to defendants* Motion for Attorney's Fees and 
Costs until after the October 23rd hearing. (R. at 286). Barnard's position was in direct 
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conflict with the trial court's directive that it intended to hear all pending motions during 
the October 23rd hearing. 
During the October 23rd hearing, Barnard objected to consideration of the Motion 
for Attorney's Fees and Costs. The trial court heard, considered and rejected those 
objections. As explained above, Barnard was previously informed that the trial court 
intended to hear all pending motions during the hearing. (R. at 110). Barnard's repeated 
efforts to prevent that from occurring did not succeed. (R. at 802 pp. 19-20). At the 
conclusion of the October 23rd hearing, the trial court granted defendants' Motion for 
Attorney's Fees and Costs, finding that plaintiffs' Complaint was frivolous and had been 
filed in bad faith such as to justify an award of attorney's fees under Utah Code Ann. § 
78-27-56. In sum, Barnard chose not to respond to the Motion for Attorney's Fees and 
Costs prior to the October 23rd hearing. 
Moreover, even after the trial court had made its oral ruling, Barnard and his 
clients filed numerous pleadings and affidavits opposing the motion for fees. (R. at 303-
05, 322-470, 473-497. 530-33). The trial court considered those pleadings and rejected 
them. (R. at 620). Just because the trial court did not agree with Barnard's position, does 
not mean that Barnard was deprived of an opportunity to respond. 
2. Plaintiffs' Position Was Frivolous. 
Barnard mistakenly argues that the trial court relied entirely upon the Ogden City 
Attorney's memorandum dated September 26. 2007, which addressed LittrelFs 
complaints, to determine that plaintiffs" claims were without merit. See Barnard's Brief 
at 40. This simply is not true. After carefull}7 reviewing plaintiffs" claims and the 
relevant ordinance, the trial court reached its own determination that (1) Mayor Godfrey 
fully complied with the Ogden City ordinance (R. at 661-62)^ and (2) "the ordinance in 
question is simple and clear, and plaintiffs' position is entirely unsupported by the plain 
language of the ordinance and in direct conflict with Utah statutory construction law." 
(R. at 662). 
The trial court did not base its determination on the memorandum prepared by the 
City Attorney. Rather, it simply noted that the City Attorney's analysis was on point, and 
that it put Barnard and his clients on notice that their claims lacked merit: 
Unlike many cases, plaintiffs' claims were reviewed, analyzed and 
appropriately rejected by the Ogden City Attorney before this lawsuit was 
filed. The Court reviewed the City Attorney's memorandum addressing 
plaintiff Dorothy LittrelPs complaints and found the memorandum to be 
accurate and on point. The City Attorney's memorandum put plaintiffs on 
notice that their position lacked any merit. 
(R. at 663). Even if Barnard's purported research mistakenly led him to believe that 
plaintiffs claims had merit, the City Attorney's memorandum, which Barnard reviewed 
prior to filing this lawsuit, put him on notice that he was wrong. (R. at 644-46). 
3. Plaintiffs Filed This Lawsuit In Bad Faith. 
In a last ditch effort to avoid the consequences of his actions, Barnard insists, once 
again, that "plaintiffs brought suit in good faith." Barnard's Brief at 41. Unfortunately, 
this argument is in direct conflict with the factual findings of the trial which Barnard 
failed to properly challenge. See supra § VI.A.4. Following extensive briefing and oral 
argument, the trial made the following finding of fact regarding bad faith: 
The [c]ourt further determined that plaintiffs brought this lawsuit in bad 
faith. Unlike many cases, plaintiffs' claims were reviewed, analyzed and 
appropriately rejected by the Ogden City Attorney before this lawsuit was 
filed. The Court reviewed the City Attorney's memorandum addressing 
plaintiff Dorothy Littrell's complaints and found the memorandum to be 
accurate and on point. The City Attorney's memorandum put plaintiffs on 
notice that their position lacked any merit. Additionally, the timing of 
plaintiffs' lawsuit (filed just weeks before the general election) and the fact 
that plaintiffs targeted only Mayor Godfrey in their lawsuit (even though he 
used the same forms as every other candidate and no other candidate listed 
the name of their PCC on their registration and financial statements) further 
demonstrate that plaintiffs filed their lawsuit in bad faith and in an effort to 
improperly influence the outcome of the election. These facts all establish 
that (1) plaintiffs lacked an honest belief in the propriety of their actions; 
(2) plaintiffs intended to take unconscionable advantage of the defendants 
through their actions; and (3) the plaintiffs intended to improperly influence 
the outcome of the mayoral election through their actions. 
(R. at 663). This factual finding is more than adequate to support the trial court's ultimate 
conclusion that plaintiffs acted in bad faith. 
In an effort to circumvent this factual finding, Barnard raises the same tired 
arguments that were rejected below. First, Barnard argues that the uCity Attorney's legal 
opinion does not constitute a legal finding and is not determinative of plaintiffs' good 
faith/' Barnard's Brief at 41. Once again, the trial court never ruled that the City 
Attorney's memorandum rejecting Littrell's complaints was dispositive. Rather, the trial 
court merely noted that even if Barnard and his clients originally failed to recognize that 
their position was "entirely unsupported by the plain language of the ordinance and in 
direct conflict with Utah statutory construction law" (R. at 662-63). the City Attorney's 
memorandum would have put them on notice that this was the case and gave them an 
opportunity to withdraw their frivolous claims. (R. at 663). 
Second. Barnard argues that plaintiffs could not name am of the other candidates 
in the lawsuit because a lawsuit could onl} be brought after a complaint was received b} 
the City Recorder and plaintiffs were only aware of the complaint lodged by Littrell 
against Mayor Godfrey. See Barnard's Brief at 42. Barnard is essentially claiming that 
because plaintiffs chose to target only Mayor Godfrey and nobody else, their hands were 
tied and they could only name Mayor Godfrey in their lawsuit. This argument is a non 
sequitur. If plaintiffs were truly concerned about ensuring tjiat the ordinance was 
properly enforced, they would have complained up front to the City Recorder about the 
conduct of each of the candidates. The fact that plaintiffs targeted Mayor Godfrey from 
the beginning and nobody else is further evidence of their bad faith. 
Third, Barnard contends that the timing of this lawsuit "was necessitated by the 
Ogden City Code" and their lawsuit would have been moot if they had waited until after 
the election. Barnard's Brief at 42-43. That is only true to the extent that the goal of the 
litigation was to remove Mayor Godfrey's name from the ballot. If Barnard and his 
clients were merely seeking an interpretation of the Ogden City ordinance as they suggest, 
then a court could have rendered such a declaration even after the election. The timing of 
plaintiffs" complaints to the City Recorder and the subsequent lawsuit, together with the 
fact that the complaint targeted Mayor Godfrey and no other candidate, further suggest 
that plaintiffs acted in bad faith. 
Finally, Barnard blindly states that ~[n]o facts establish Tack of merit' nor 'bad 
faith" in this action." Barnard's Brief at 43. This statement highlights counsel's myopic 
view of this case. Barnard has ignored all of the facts and factual findings that conflict 
with his position. As a result, this Court must assume that the lower court's findings are 
adequately supported. See Cache Count)* v. Bens. 2005 UT App 503. *\ 6. 128 P.3d 63 
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("'In order to establish that findings of fact are clearly erroneous, c[a]n appellant must 
marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this 
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear 
weight of the evidence.' 'If the evidence is inadequately marshaled, this court assumes 
that all findings are adequately supported by the evidence/"). 
Moreover, the issue of whether plaintiffs' claims lacked merit is a question of law, 
not a question of fact. See, e.g., In re Olympus Constr., 2007 UT App 36L f^ 9, 173 P.3d 
192. In order to establish that a claim is "without merit," a party must demonstrate that a 
claim is "frivolous" or "of little weight or importance having no basis in law or fact." 
Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983). The trial court complied with this 
standard in determining that plaintiffs' claims lacked merit. After carefully reviewing 
plaintiffs' claims and the language of the Ogden City ordinance, the trial court made the 
following determination: "[Pjlaintiffs' lawsuit was without merit. This determination was 
based upon the fact that the ordinance in question is simple and clear, and plaintiffs' 
position is entirely unsupported by the plain language of the ordinance and in direct 
conflict with Utah statutory construction law. Stated differently, plaintiffs' lawsuit was 
frivolous and had no basis in law7 or fact/" (R. at 662-63). 
The trial court also properly found that plaintiffs filed their lawsuit in bad faith. 
"A finding of bad faith must be based on at least one of the following three factors: k(i) 
The part}7 lacked an honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question: (ii) the 
part}7 intended to take unconscionable advantage of others: or (iii) the party7 intended to or 
acted with the knowledge that the activities in question would hinder, delay, or defraud 
others.'5' Gallegos v. Lloyd, 2008 UT App 405 *{ 15, 178 P.3d 922 (quoting Valcarce v. 
Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998)); accord Still Standing Stable, LLCv. Allen, 2005 
UT46, t l2 ,122P.3d556. 
The trial court made several detailed factual findings on the issue of bad faith, 
including the following: 
The [c]ourt further determined that plaintiffs brought this lawsuit in bad 
faith. Unlike many cases, plaintiffs' claims were reviewed, analyzed and 
appropriately rejected by the Ogden City Attorney before this lawsuit was 
filed. The Court reviewed the City Attorney's memorandum addressing 
plaintiff Dorothy Littrell's complaints and found the memorandum to be 
accurate and on point. The City Attorney's memorandum put plaintiffs on 
notice that their position lacked any merit. Additionally, the timing of 
plaintiffs' lawsuit (filed just weeks before the general election) and the fact 
that plaintiffs targeted only Mayor Godfrey in their lawsuit (even though he 
used the same forms as every other candidate and no other candidate listed 
the name of their PCC on their registration and financial statements) further 
demonstrate that plaintiffs filed their lawsuit in bad f^ith and in an effort to 
improperly influence the outcome of the election. These facts all establish 
that (1) plaintiffs lacked an honest belief in the propriety of their actions; 
(2) plaintiffs intended to take unconscionable advantage of the defendants 
through their actions; and (3) the plaintiffs intended to improperly influence 
the outcome of the mayoral election through their actions. 
(R. at 663). This factual finding standing alone satisfies not just one but all three of the 
bad faith factors set forth in Gallegos. 
With regard to the trial court's determination that plaintiffs filed their lawsuit in 
bad faith, this is a question of fact that is reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard. 
See, e.g., In re Olympus Constr., 2009 UT App 361, U 9, 173 P-3d 192. Once again, 
Barnard baldly asserts that "[nl° facts support a finding of bad faith on the part of 
plaintiffs." Barnard's Brief at 45. Unfortunately, Barnard h^s made no effort to marshal 
the evidence in support of the trial court's factual deterniinaition. Therefore, the Court 
47 
must assume that those factual findings are true and adequately supported. 
The following are just a small sampling of the evidence supporting the trial court's 
finding of bad faith: 
The lead plaintiff in the case, Dorothy LittrelL has been a long-time critic of 
Mayor Godfrey and his administration. (R. at 121). 
The language of the Ogden City ordinance is simple and clear, and 
plaintiffs' position was entirely unsupported by the plain language of the ordinance 
and in direct conflict with Utah statutory construction law. (R. at 662-63). 
• Mayor Godfrey fully complied with the Odgen City ordinance and made all 
of the necessary filings. Significantly, Mayor Godfrey registered his PCC on the 
registration forms prepared and provided by Ogden City. Moreover, Mayor 
Godfrey used the very same forms as every other mayoral candidate. None of the 
other candidates provided the specific name of their PCC on the registration forms 
because Section 1-8-2D does not require them to do so and the forms did not 
request such information. (R. at 19, 159, 163-67). 
The City Attorney reviewed Littrelfs complaints regarding Mayor 
Godfrey's alleged noncompliance with the ordinance and found them to be entirely 
without merit. The City Attorney analyzed and explained his decision in a 
memorandum dated September 26, 2007, a copy of which was provided to Littrell 
on September 28, 2007, three days before this lawsuit was filed. (R. at 159, 203-
210). Thus, Barnard and plaintiffs were on notice that their claims were frivolous 
and lacked merit prior to filing this lawsuit. (R. at 663). Despite receiving this 
information, plaintiffs chose to file their frivolous Complaint and Motion for 
Immediate Injunction and Extraordinary Writ, forcing defendants to incur legal 
fees and expenses. 
• On October 5, 2007, in a telephone conversation with counsel for the 
Ogden City defendants. Barnard confirmed that he had received Mr. Williams" 
memorandum prior to the filing of the Complaint. Thus, counsel also had an 
opportunity to correct plaintiffs* frivolous interpretation of the ordinance. (R. at 
644-46). 
On October 11, 2007, counsel for Mansell and Williams sent Barnard a safe 
harbor letter advising him that the lawsuit was frivolous and defendants intended 
to seek fees and costs if it was not dismissed immediately. (R. at 648). The same 
day they sent the safe harbor letter, defendants Mansell and Williams filed their 
Motion to Dismiss and a Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs, seeking attorney's 
fees and costs under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. (R. at 113-149). These filings 
further outlined the frivolous nature of plaintiffs* lawsuit. Plaintiffs rejected these 
warnings. 
The timing of the lawsuit, filed just weeks before the general election, 
coupled with the unsupported allegations being asserted, suggest that plaintiffs' 
primary motive was to tarnish Mayor Godfrey's reputation and improperly 
influence the outcome of the election. (R. at 1-85, 145, 663). 
• Plaintiffs' erroneous allegations that Mayor Godfrey violated the Ogden 
City ordinance and that the City blatantly refused to enforce the ordinance received 
substantial attention from the local media. (R. at 145i 
• Rather than plainly acknowledging that Mayor 
required filings in his personal name rather than in thd name of his PCC, plaintiffs 
46). 
Godfrey made each of the 
Mayor Godfrey and his PCC 
-44). 
gave the trial court and the public the impression that 
altogether failed to make the required filings. (R. at ll-
If plaintiffs were truly concerned with enforcing the City's campaign 
finance disclosure requirements, they would have taken similar action against all 
of the candidates, not just Mayor Godfrey. (R. at 159 163-67, 506-07). 
If plaintiffs truly wanted to have Ogden City's ordinance interpreted, they 
could have filed a declaratory judgment action naming only the City. See, e.g., 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-2 (2007). Instead, plaintiffs chose to target Mayor 
Godfrey, while ignoring the fact that every other candidate was also allegedly in 
violation of City's ordinance based upon plaintiffs' incorrect interpretation. (R. at 
507-08). 
In an effort to circumvent the trial court's finding of bad faith, plaintiffs 
filed a series of identical affidavits demonstrating their purported good faith. (R. 
at 322-470). Unfortunately, the affidavits were "all essentially identical and 
[were] merely a boiler plate production." Plaintiffs tried to convince the trial court 
that they all uhad the exact same feeling about filing tjtie lawsuit, went through the 
exact same process of reviewing the ordinance, and rdached exactly the same 
conclusions." (R. at 620-21). These defective affidavits are further evidence of 
plaintiffs' bad faith. 
This is just a portion of the evidence underlying the trial court's finding of bad 
faith. In light of this substantial body of evidence, Barnard 0annot show that "the trial 
court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the 
evidence." Cache County v. Beus* 2005 UT App 503, % 6. l£8 P.3d 63. This is likely the 
reason why Barnard elected to ignore his obligation to marshal the evidence. 
Accordingly, the Court should affirm the lower court Is finding that plaintiffs* 
lawsuit was brought in bad faith. 
C. THE COURT SHOULD AWARD MANSELL AND WILLIAMS THEIR 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS INCURRED ON APPEAL. 
"
c[W]hen a party who received attorney fees below prevails on appeal, the party is 
also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal/" K.F.K. v. T. W.* 2005 UT App 85, j^ 
7. 110 P.3d 162 (quoting Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305, 319 (Utah 1998)). 
Therefore, appellees are entitled to recover the fees and costs incurred on appeal. This is 
particularly true given that the trial court only awarded appellees a portion of the 
attorney's fees and costs they incurred below in defending this "vindictive, frivolous, bad 
faith lawsuit/' (R. at 663-64).17 Barnard's appeal has forced appellees to unnecessarily 
incur additional fees and costs. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, appellees Cindi Mansell and Gary Williams respectfully 
submit that the trial court's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions in the amount of $10,000 
against appellant Brian M. Barnard should be affirmed and appellees should be awarded 
the attorney's fees and costs incurred on appeal. 
DATED thisZoday of February. 2009. 
SNOW, Cffi^STENSEN^ MARTINEAU 
AttorneysTor Appellees Cindi Mansell 
and Gar}7 Williams 
]7Barnard*s request for fees as the prevailing party under Rule 11(c)(1)(A) should 
be summarily denied. See Barnard's Brief at 50 n.21. As detailed by the trial court. 
Barnard violated the provisions of Rule 11(b). (R. at 748-754. 763-770). Under no 
circumstances, should he be rewarded for his misconduct. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the"2S_day of February, 200911 caused two (2) true and 
correct copies of the BRIEF OF APPELLEES to be mailed! bv first class United States 
Mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
BRIAN M. BARNARD 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
214 East 500 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant Brian M, Barnard 
ADDENDUM 
A. Ogden Municipal Code § 1-8-1 et seq. 
1-8-1: DEFINITIONS: 
For the purpose of this Chapter, the following words shall have the meaning as defined in 
this Section: 
CANDIDATE: Any person who: 
A. Files a declaration of candidacy for an elected office of the City; or 
B. Receives contributions or makes expenditures or consents to another person receiving 
contributions or making expenditures with a view to bringing about such person's 
nomination or election to such office; or 
C. Causes on his or her behalf, any written material or advertisement to be printed, 
published, broadcast, distributed or disseminated which indicates an intention to seek 
such office. 
CONTRIBUTIONS: A. Contributions shall include: 
1. A gift, subscription, donation, unpaid or partially unpaid loan, advance, or deposit of 
money or anything of value; 
2. A contract, promise or agreement, express or implied, vj/hether or not legally 
enforceable to make a contribution; 
3. A transfer of funds from a political committee, a party committee, another candidate, 
an officeholder, or a personal campaign committee to a candidate or a candidate's 
personal campaign committee; 
4. A payment for the personal sen/ices of another person by a person other than the 
candidate's personal campaign committee for services rerldered to the candidate or 
such candidate's personal campaign committee; and 
5. Goods or services provided at less than fair market valije to or for the benefit of a 
candidate or a candidate's personal campaign committee. 
B. Contributions shall not include: 
1. Personal services provided without compensation by individuals volunteering their 
time on behalf of a candidate or such candidate's personal campaign committee; or 
2. A loan of money by a national or State bank made in accordance with the applicable 
banking laws and regulations and in the ordinary course of business. 
ELECTION: A general or primary election conducted by the City. 
EXPENDITURE: An expenditure shall include: 
A. A purchase, payment, donation, distribution, loan, advdnce, deposit, gift of money or 
anything of value made for the purpose of influencing the pomination or election of any 
candidate: 
I A I 
B. A contract, promise or agreement, express or implied, whether or not legally 
enforceable to make any expenditure; 
C. A transfer of funds by a candidate or a personal campaign committee to another 
candidate, another candidate's personal campaign committee or a political committee; 
D. Goods or services provided to or for the benefit of another candidate, another 
candidate's personal campaign committee, or a political committee for political 
purposes at less than fair market value. 
PERSON: Both natural and legal persons, including, but not limited to, business 
organizations, personal campaign committees, party committees, labor unions, labor 
organizations and any other organized group of individuals. 
PERSONAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE: The political committee appointed by a particular 
candidate to act for such candidate as hereinafter provided. 
POLITICAL COMMITTEE: A person or group of persons cooperating to aid or promote the 
success or defeat of a candidate, including the making of donations to a personal campaign 
committee. 
POLITICAL PURPOSE: An act done with intent or in such way as to influence or tend to 
influence, directly or indirectly, the election of a candidate at a Municipal election. 
PRIMARY ELECTION: Any primary election held pursuant to Utah Code Annotated title 20A, 
or its successor, and/or any election held prior to the general election as provided by Utah 
Code Annotated title 20A, or its successor. 
REPORTING PERIOD: The period beginning from the date of either the first contribution or 
the first expenditure, or since the closing date of the last filed financial statement, if any, and 
the closing date of a financial statement to be filed. 
(1979 Code § 1.20,010; Ord. 95-53, 7-18-1995) 
1-8-2: PERSONAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE: 
A. Required: No person or persons shall receive any contributions on behalf of a candidate 
for elected office of the City or make any expenditures for political purposes for the 
candidate either directly or indirectly other than through a personal campaign committee, 
whose authority to act shall be filed as provided by this Chapter. 
B. Appointment: A candidate shall appoint no more than one personal campaign committee 
to consist of one or more persons, or the candidate individually who may constitute the 
committee. 
C. Contributions; Secretary: No candidate shall solicit contributions or authorize expenditures 
in furtherance of his or her candidacy except through such candidate's personal 
campaign committee. If the personal campaign committee consists of only one person, 
such person is deemed the secretary. If the candidate acts a$ personal campaign 
committee, the candidate is deemed the secretary. 
(1979 Code § 120.020; Ord. 95-53, 7-18-1995) 
D. Registration: Before the personal campaign committee make^ any expenditure for political 
purposes on behalf of the candidate, or incurs any obligation! express or implied, to make 
an expenditure in the candidate's behalf, the candidate or committee shall file with the 
City Recorder a written statement, signed by the candidate setting forth that the 
candidate's personal campaign committee has been appointed or elected, and giving the 
name and address of each member and the secretary of the Icommittee. 
(1979 Code § 1.20.030; Ord. 95-53, 7-18-1995) 
E. Changes; Withdrawal: Any candidate may revoke the selection of any member of such 
candidate's personal campaign committee by a revocation in writing filed with the City 
Recorder. Any individual may voluntarily withdraw from a conhmittee by filing a written 
notice with the City Recorder. The date of withdrawal is the date the notice is received by 
the City Recorder. A candidate may fill any vacancy. A candidate shall be deemed the 
secretary until a replacement is appointed. 
(1979 Code § 1.20.040; Ord. 95-53, 7-18-1995) 
1-8-3: CONTRIBUTIONS TO CANDIDATES: 
A. Cash Limitation: No person shall make cash contributions during any one reporting period 
as set forth in this Chapter, to any candidate or his or her authorized personal campaign 
committee with respect to any election for City office, which exceeds fifty dollars ($50.00); 
however, there shall be no limit as to the amount contributed by a person to a personal 
campaign committee or a political committee if that contribution is made in the form of a 
personal or certified check or bank draft. 
B. Anonymous: The acceptance of anonymous contributions is prohibited. Any anonymous 
contributions received by a candidate or personal campaign committee shall be 
transmitted to the City Treasurer for deposit in the General Fund. 
(1979 Code § 1.20.050; Ord. 95-53, 7-18-1995) 
C. In Name Of Another: No person shall make a contribution in the name of another person 
or make a contribution with another person's funds in his or her own name, and no 
candidate, member of a personal campaign committee, or political campaign committee 
shall knowingly accept a contribution made by one person in the name of another person 
or made by one person with the funds of another person. 
(1979 Code § 1.20.060; Ord. 95-53, 7-18-1995) 
ill
 m - i . f I N A N U / U . !"I il A i i.Mi ih" mi .>: 
A. Forms: Forms for all statements required by this Chapter shall be prepared by the City 
Recorder and copies thereof, together with a copy of this Chapter, shall be furnished by 
the City Recorder to the secretary of every committee and to every candidate without 
charge. 
(1979 Code § 1.20.080A; Ord. 95-53, 7-18-1995) 
B. Filing; Dates: bach candidate or political campaign committee shall file with the City 
Recorder a verified financial statement containing the information required in this 
Chapter, by five o'clock (5:00) P.M , c n the following dates: 
1. Ten (10) days before the date of the primary election, if the candidate is involved in the 
primary election; 
2. Ten (10) days before the general election; and 
3. f lo latei than tt nitty (30) days after the date of the general election. 
C. Candidates Eliminated: Candidates for elective office who are eliminated at a primary" 
election shall file a campaign financial statement, signed and verified by the candidate, 
containing the information required by this Section not later than thirty (30) days after the 
priman ' election. 
D. Contents; Closing Date: The statement shall contain ail expenditures and contributions 
within the reporting period. The closing date for each statement shall be two (2) days 
before the date on which the statement must be filed,. Each financial statement shall 
contain: 
1. A summary of contributions, expenditures, loans and debts reported in previously-filed 
financial statements; 
2. A; list of each contribution in excess of fifty dollars ($50.00) received by the committee, 
the name and address of each contributor, and the date on which each such contribution 
was received; 
3. An aggregate total of all contribution* rf fifty i Mhis fT^0 Of i nr less i -ceiveo b\ Ihe 
committee; and 
4. A list of ail expei iditui es r nade and obligations incurred but not paid during the 
reporting period, the name and address of every recipient to whom disbursement was 
made,, and the purposes of the expenditure made or obligation incurred, 
E. certification: Each statement shall be certified by the secretary or by the candidate to the 
effect that all contributions and expenditures not heretofore reported have been reported 
and that there are no bills or obligations outstanding and unpaid except as set forth in the 
report. 
F No Contributions Or Expenditures: In the event the committee had no contributions or 
expenditures during the reporting period, the statement shall state that no contributions 
have been received nor any expenditures made. 
(1979 Code § 1.20.070; Ord. 95-53, 7-18-1995) 
G. Public Inspection; Preservation: All statements required by this Chapter shall be open to 
public inspection and copying at the office of the City Recorder during normal business 
hours and all such statements shall be preserved by the City Recorder for a period of five 
(5) years from January 1 of the year following the election for which they are filed. 
(1979 Code § 1.20.080B; Ord. 95-53, 7-18-1995) 
^URAT _;-: 
A. Ii ispection; Written Notice: The City Recorder shall inspect all fir lancial statements w it! lit i 
two (2) days after the same are filed. If it appears that any candidate or personal 
campaign committee has failed to file a statement as required by law or if it appears that 
the statement does not conform to law or upon complaint in writing by a candidate or by a 
voter that a statement filed does not conform to law, the City Recorder shall notify the 
delinquent personal campaign committee or candidate, in writing, requesting compliance 
with this Chapter. Written notice as required herein, may be given in the following 
manner: 
1. Delivery , in |> IMHI k> !h,:j '"':indii1al>' i i \h s^orrNv nf ihn pi-rson.n i diiup -\\'\w 
committee; 
2. Deliver/ to a person of suitable age and discretion at the address of the candidate or 
the address of the secretary of the personal campaign committee, as indicated in 
registration form for the personal campaign committee as reqi lired i mder subsection 
1-8-2D of this Chapi-r -
_; -w-: jiiea man. ; ;o u : • ..- the secretary of the personal campaign. 
committee at the adcrdo3 as inc. ; e registration form for the personal campaign 
committee as reauired under sur • ?-2D of this Chapter 
B. Examination Of Boc cords: Upon the failure of any personal campaign 
committee or cand;- - a statement, within two (2) days after first receiving written 
notice under subse :/ 'his Section, or, if in the exercise of reasonable discretion, 
the City Recorder questions the accuracy or completeness of such statement, the City 
Recorder shall request an examination of all books and records of such committee or 
person. Such books and records shall be produced by the candidate or personal 
campaign committee for inspection by the City Recorder within one day after request for 
examination is received, 
C. Violation; Notification To City Attorney: If a personal campaign committee or candidate 
fails to file a statement within 'two (2) days after receiving notice under subsection A of 
this Section, or, if any statement filed discloses a violation of this Chapter, or, if the 
inspection of records discloses a violation of this Chapter, the City Recorder shall notify 
the City Attorney and shall furnish the City Attorney copies of all papers in the City 
Recorder's possession relating thereto, and the City Attorney, on such corniDlan: or the 
complaint of any other person, shall enter forthwith the same in a docket Kept for that 
purpose in his or her office and within ten (10) days thereafter shall examine every case. 
If the evidence is deemed sufficient by the City Attorney, he or she shall institute such 
civil or criminal proceedings, as may be appropriate. 
D. Registered Voter May Institute Proceedings: in the event the City Recorder or the City 
Attorney refuses to take the actions provided by this Section, any registered voter in the 
City may institute appropriate proceedings for an extraordinary writ. 
(1979 Code § 1.20.090; : rd 95 53, 7 18-1995) 
1-8-6: UNLAWFUL ACTS DESIGNATED: 
A. Name On Ballot Prior To Filing Statement: The name of a candidate shall not be printed 
on, or if already printed shall be removed from, the official ballot for the ensuing election 
unless the statements of contributions and expenditures relating to the candidate have 
been filed by the candidate or the candidate's personal campaign committee as required 
by this Chapter. 
B. Oath Of Office Prior To Filing Statement: It is unlawful to administer the oath of office, or 
to issue a certificate of election to any candidate for the offices of Mayor or 
Councilmember until the candidate's personal campaign committee has filed the financial 
disclosure statements as required by this Chapter, or its successor, which statements 
shall be complete upon their face and show compliance to the provisions of this Chapter, 
and no person shall enter upon the duties of the office until the personal campaign 
committee has filed the required statements, nor shall any salary or fees be received by 
that person for a period prior to filing of the statements. 
(1979 Code § 1.20.100A, 1.20.100B; Ord. 95-53, 7-18-1995) 
I •*!•/: HLNAI I 
Any person violating any provision of this Chapter is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor, 
punishable under Chapter 4 of this Title, and no person convicted thereof shall be permitted 
to take or hold the office to which the person was elected, if any, or receive the emoluments 
thereof. 
(1979 Code § 1.20.100C; Ord. 95-53, 7-18-1995) 
